In criminal cases
• The presumption of innocence is specifi cally enshrined in Art 6 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) but it is not recognised as an absolute since legislatures may reverse the burden of proof within reasonable limits which take account of the importance of what is at stake and of maintaining the rights of the defendant.
• In English law the principle of placing the burden of proof on the prosecution was acknowledged under the common law, although it was not until Woolmington v DPP (1935) that the courts fully acknowledged that this applied to the mens rea as well as the actus reus .
• A criminal offence may contain several elements and there may be therefore several different allocations of the burden of proof.
• Where the prosecution bears the burden of proof, the standard is beyond reasonable doubt. If the defence bears the burden the standard is the balance of probabilities.
• The term burden of proof should strictly be reserved for the legal or persuasive burden which is determined at the end of the trial when the jury decides whether to convict or not.
The party that has the legal burden usually has the evidential burden, ie is the burden of adducing suffi cient evidence to make the issue a live one at the trial. (It also known as the burden of passing the judge.) Exceptions to this are certain common law defences where the defendant has the evidential burden before the judge will allow them to be considered by the jury. The court may read down a statutory provision in order to comply with Art 6 .
In civil cases
• The principle in civil cases is he who asserts must prove. The placing of the burden of proof would therefore be apparent from the statement of claim and any counterclaim or specifi c defence, such as reference to an exclusion clause in contract or to contributory negligence.
Presumptions
• Presumptions work on occasion to remove the need for proof. They are mostly of signifi cance in relation to civil cases.
• Factual presumptions are common sense logical inferences from a state of affairs.
• Irrebuttable presumptions of law are provisions of the substantive law, such as the provision that a child of 10 and over has criminal liability.
• Rebuttable presumptions of law cover situations where, once foundational facts have been proved by a party, a particular state of affairs will be assumed to exist. the allocation of the burden of proof in criminal cases raises both principled constitutional questions and practical problem-solving ones. As far as the former is concerned, you need to have read widely on what has been a fertile area for academic comment of late. As for the latter, you may be asked specifi cally to advise on the burden and standard of proof or you may assume that it forms an indispensable part of any question which gives you a scenario and asks you to 'Advise on evidence'. A common feature of such questions is to give you an imaginary statute which includes an apparent reverse burden and to ask you how the courts will approach this. Watch out also for references to common law defences, such as self-defence. They give you an opportunity to display your knowledge of evidential burdens.
Questions on civil trials are likely to concentrate on two areas. These are the question of whether the standard of proof ever approaches the criminal standard and also the shifting of the burden during the trial as claimant and defendant put claim and counterclaim, such as relying on an exclusion clause in a contract.
Revision tip
You need to refresh your memory about the meaning of key terms which you will have also studied in criminal law. These include the elements of an offence, actus reus and mens rea, common law and statutory defences.
This topic is really about who will bear the risk of losing a trial. A simple example from civil trials explains the point. Suppose that the claimant, C sues the defendant, D on the grounds that he failed to perform a contractual obligation to deliver some goods. D claims he did deliver. C is not able to provide proof to convince the court on the balance of probabilities that the goods were not delivered. Should the court: In fact it will decide in favour of D here since in civil cases, 'He who asserts must prove' is the principle. It was C who initiated the case so he bears the risk of losing if he cannot produce proof to the required standard: the balance of probabilities. In a criminal case the 'presumption of innocence' has the effect of placing the burden of proof on the prosecution, who also of course initiate proceedings. This is a principle of the common law enshrined specifi cally also in Art 6 ECHR . If the prosecution cannot prove the case against the defendant to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt the defendant is acquitted. Legally he does not have to produce evidence of innocence, although tactically he will be well advised to do so.
There are three problematic areas in relation to the burden of proof which will be reviewed in this chapter. The fi rst two relate specifi cally to criminal trials. They are fi rst, the terminology, particularly the difference between the legal and the evidential burdens; second, the rationale behind reverse burdens; and third, the contentious subject of the standard of proof in civil cases where the allegation by the claimant is of a quasi-criminal act such as fraud.
The standard of proof in criminal cases is more straightforward and will be covered in outline. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of presumptions.
Legal and evidential burdens
You must be careful how you use language in this area, which is a terminological minefi eld.
You need to understand clearly the difference between the legal and evidential burdens. In particular, bear in mind that it is best to reserve the term 'burden of proof' for the legal (or persuasive) burden.
Legal/persuasive burden of proof: This is the burden which is discharged at the end of the trial when the jury gives its verdict or the civil court makes a decision.
Evidential burden: This is the burden of adducing suffi cient evidence to convince the judge there is an issue to put before the court. Chronologically, it occurs at an earlier stage of the trial than the discharging of the legal burden. For the prosecution the task is to establish that there is a prima facie case. The test is set out in R v Galbraith (1981 There are two preliminary keys to understanding this area, which some students take time to grasp:
• fi rst, be aware that there may not be one burden of proof in a trial but several according to the various elements of the offence and any statutory or common law defences; and
• second, it may help to consider how the burdens may shift over time as the trial progresses.
The prosecution initiate the case and they have the initial evidential burden of 'passing the judge', ie convincing the court that there is enough evidence on which a trial can go ahead in the sense that there is a case to answer. The prosecution also have the legal burden of convincing the jury of the defendant's guilt on the charge. The defendant legally at this stage does not have any burden. A not guilty plea is enough to make every matter a fact in issue, including the identity of the defendant. Tactically, of course, it would be wise for the defendant to produce some evidence which might raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury, but legally there is no requirement to do so. The general rule is that the party which has the legal burden has the evidential burden but there are a number of exceptions. The situation changes if the defendant plans to raise a particular defence or if the statute purports to reverse a burden. In such situations the defendant may have only an evidential burden, or, if the court considers it reasonable and proportionate in the light of the provision of Art 6(2) , the evidential and the legal burden. How the courts decide how to allocate the burden is reviewed in the next section.
Placing the burden in criminal cases
Generally, the party which has a legal burden also has the evidential burden. There are two situations where the legal and the evidential burden may be split:
Common law defences
You will have come across the details of these leading cases in your criminal law course and most evidence courses will require you to be able to cite an authority for the placing of the evidential burden of a common law defence on the defence. Remember that the defence of accident is not a common law defence. As Woolmington (1935) decided, it acts to negative mens rea . See Fig 2. 1 . Remember that the legal burden in these cases remains on the prosecution.
Statutory defences or elements of the offence
See the following discussion for a consideration of the principles of statutory interpretation.
The legal burden and the golden thread
Every law student will know by heart the passage from Woolmington v DPP (1935) referring in reverential terms to the golden thread while even then acknowledging two sets of exceptions, one, the defence of insanity, based on common law and the other based on statute, either by express or implied provision.
Reggie Woolmington was convicted of the murder of his wife by shooting. He claimed the gun had been fi red accidentally. The trial judge and the Court of Appeal had held that the defence of proving lack of mens rea was on him. The House of Lords allowed the appeal and stated that at common law in criminal proceedings the burden of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, the actus reus and the mens rea is on the prosecution. The only two exceptions to this rule were the defence of insanity and statutory provisions. Viscount Sankey stated (at pp481-482):
Throughout the web of English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt … No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.
Revision tip
Woolmington recognised one common law exception to placing the burden of proof (legal and evidential) on the prosecution. An accused who raises insanity bears the legal burden of proving it, see McNaghton's Case (1843) . In such cases remember that the standard is the balance of probabilities (see more on this later). This is a controversial requirement since, in effect, the accused is asked to prove the absence of mens rea . You should demonstrate in any question on this that the case raises questions about two presumptions: that of innocence and that of sanity. In H v United Kingdom (1990) , the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the insanity exception did not breach Art 6(2) since the rule did 'not concern the presumption of innocence, as such, but the presumption of sanity'.
Revision tip Revision tip
Woolmington recognised one common law exception to placing the burden of proof (legal and evidential) on the prosecution. An accused who raises insanity bears the legal burden of proving it, see McNaghton's Case (1843) . In such cases remember that the standard is the balance of probabilities (see more on this later). This is a controversial requirement since, in effect, the accused is asked to prove the absence of mens rea . You should demonstrate in any question on this that the case raises questions about two presumptions: that of innocence and that of sanity. In H v United Kingdom (1990) , the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the insanity exception did not breach Art 6(2) since the rule did 'not concern the presumption of innocence, as such, but the presumption of sanity'. The common law approach to the burden of proof continued after Woolmington with the fl urry of academic commentary arising from the two cases, R v Edwards (1974) and R v Hunt (1986) . Most evidence courses include a review of the reasoning in these cases, which is still pertinent in relation to regulatory offences. This reasoning was much criticised by academics as marking a retreat from principle to public policy considerations which were very loosely expressed in both judgments. [1975] QB 27 E was convicted of selling alcohol without a licence. He appealed on the grounds that the prosecution had not produced evidence that he had not been granted a licence. His appeal was dismissed.
R v Edwards
The Court of Appeal held that under the common law, where a statute prohibited an act save in specifi ed circumstances, the court could construe the statute such that the burden of proving the existence of the circumstances, including the granting of a licence, could lie on the defendant. 
R v Hunt

Human Rights Act and burden of proof
There is probably no area of evidence law which has been more affected by the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 than that of the allocation of the burden of proof in criminal cases. The presumption of innocence is specifi cally enshrined in Art 6(2) but the Strasbourg court has not taken it to be an absolute principle. In Salabiaku v France (1988) the European Court of Human Rights found there was no principled objection to the imposition of strict liability in a criminal case involving violation of customs regulations. This should be applied 'within reasonable limits' and subject to the test of proportionality in that the courts should balance the interests of the community and the rights of the individual.
The ECHR and English law
At fi rst it seemed that the English courts in applying the ECHR were adopting a more robust approach to upholding the presumption of innocence. In R v DPP, ex p Kebilene ( Bingham had stated that the provisions blatantly undermined the presumption of innocence.
In the event the House did not have to decide the matter since it was held that the issue in the hearing was not reviewable. However, in R v Lambert, Ali and Jordan (2002) , the House, in a majority decision, held that it was not justifi able to use s28 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 so as • Examine the wording of the statute to see if it creates an exception, exemption, etc.
• The approach should be the same whether the offence is tried summarily or on indictment.
• Where the legal burden is on D the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.
• Examine what the mischief was that the statute was addressing.
• Examine the practical problems in allocating the burden of proof, including who would find it easier to discharge.
• Examine the seriousness of the offence, which could resolve ambiguity in favour of the defence. Navigating your way through this confl icting scenario therefore is not easy. The following account will act as a compass. You will perhaps be tempted in addressing a problem to repeat the mantra that each decision is made on its own facts and that it is impossible to derive principles to apply to the problem. This will not get you many marks. Rather, you should familiarise yourself with the judgments and their nuances and consider them in the context of the question you have to address.
Looking for extra marks? Looking for extra marks?
In order to perform well in your assessment you should show evidence of wider reading than the stand- 
Reverse burdens and statute
Consider the following provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA 1974) :
• s2(1) It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all his employees.
• s3(1) It shall be the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety.
• s37 Where an offence under any of the relevant statutory provisions committed by a body corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary
or other similar offi cer of the body corporate or a person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he, as well as the body corporate, shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
These provisions place on the defendant, an employer, or a corporation, a duty to provide a safe place of work, the breach of which is a criminal offence. A separate section gives the defendant employer a possible defence:
• s40 In any proceedings for an offence under any of the relevant statutory provisions consisting of a failure to comply with a duty or requirement to do something so far as is practicable or so far as is reasonably practicable, or to use the best practicable means to do something, it shall be for the accused to prove (as the case may be) that it was not practicable or not reasonably practicable to do more than was in fact done to satisfy the duty or requirement, or that there was no better practicable means than was in fact used to satisfy the duty or requirement.
In R v Chargot Ltd (2009) Chargot was charged with breaching this statute following an accident in which an employee who was driving a dumper truck was killed when the lorry load fell on him. The House of Lords considered where the burden of proving the defence under s40 lay. It held that the legal burden was on the defendant employer to prove that it was not reasonably practicable to provide the safe conditions. The employer was convicted. (1) A person commits an offence if he belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation.
Contrast this with the decision in
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove -(a) that the organisation was not proscribed on the last (or only) occasion on which he became a member or began to profess to be a member, and (b) that he has not taken part in the organisation since it was proscribed.
The defendant was charged with belonging to the proscribed organisation Hamas. He relied on s11(2) in his defence. The House held that (by a majority judgment on this point), notwithstanding that it was Parliament's intention to impose a legal burden on the defendant, he should only bear the evidential burden. It is worth quoting part of the headnote (p264) in full:
the justifi ability and fairness of provisions which imposed a burden of proof on a defendant in a criminal trial had to be judged in the particular context of each case, and the court's task was to decide whether Parliament had unjustifi ably infringed the presumption of innocence; that the overriding concern was that a trial should be fair, and the presumption of innocence was a fundamental right directed to that end; that the Convention did not outlaw presumptions of fact or law but required that
they should be kept within reasonable limits and should not be arbitrary; that it was open to states to defi ne the constituent elements of a criminal offence, excluding the requirement of mens rea ; but that the substance and effect of any presumption adverse to a defendant had to be examined on all the facts and circumstances of a particular provision and had to be reasonable.
The outcome of these cases is set out in Figs 2.3 and 2.4 . Judicial deference Dennis (p909) distinguishes between legitimate aim, which it is the task of Parliament to pronounce on when making an enactment, and proportionality. The latter is a procedural not a substantive issue and therefore the courts should be more robust here in challenging provisions.
Cases cited by Dennis Comment and additional cases
See Lord Clyde in Lambert (2001) Dennis (p911) points out the difficulty in determining the moral quality of criminal offences and in particular that it does not necessarily follow that a statutory defence to a regulatory defence will be any easier for a defendant to prove. Signifi cance of maximum penalties The burden should more properly be on the prosecution for an element of the offence. However, Dennis (p913) observes that it may be acceptable on occasion to place a reverse burden for an element of the offence in the sense that not having a licence is an essential element of the offence of unlicensed driving. 'Peculiar/special knowledge' relates to state of mind. Dennis (p915) points out that Edwards (1974) had rejected the approach to peculiar knowledge which had earlier been a feature of the common law allowing reversal of the burden of proof. The current common law position is that peculiar knowledge in relation to certain common law defences places an evidential burden only. Dennis continues his analysis by identifying additional principles which he argues should be considered. A more structured approach, he suggests (p919), would be achieved by elevating ease of production of proof, which, following Edwards , would 'require a defendant to prove a formal qualifi cation to do an act that is otherwise prohibited by legislation'. However, questions of moral blameworthiness, particularly questions of mens rea, should be on the prosecution. Dennis's analysis on this point in some ways has been confi rmed by the decision in could not reasonably be regarded as 'blameworthy or such as should properly attract criminal sanctions', namely belonging to an organisation which was not at that time proscribed. If the only defence available to the defendant was s11(2), to show that he had not taken part in the activities at any time while it was proscribed, he should only have an evidential burden.
As Dennis himself acknowledges (p923), it is diffi cult to overcome problems even in this structured approach. The nature of moral blameworthiness is historically and socially These fi rst two stages of judicial decision-making, according to Dennis (p927), establish whether a reverse onus is 'justifi ed as proportionate to a legitimate aim'. If it is not so justifi ed the courts move on to the third stage and examine whether the section can be 'read down' to impose only an evidential burden (see pp925-927). Dennis comments (p927), 'On the basis of Sheldrake it seems that it will almost always be possible to do this … Accordingly a declaration of incompatibility of a reverse onus will almost never be necessary.'
Presumption of innocence
We have set out as a fl ow chart, Fig 2. 11 , the three-stage process identifi ed by Dennis.
Revision tip
Identify the facts in issue in a problem scenario. This may include all the elements of the offence and also any statutory or common law defences. Note that statute may expressly place an evidential burden on the defence -see s54(5) Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the defence of 'loss of control' on a charge of murder. It is a useful exercise to do this in the form of a table since it makes it clear that there may be a number of burdens in any one case.
Burden of proof in civil cases
With regard to civil common law cases the allocation of the burden is apparent from the statement of claim. If the claimant fails to prove any essential element of his claim, such as duty of care in a negligence suit, the defendant will be entitled to judgment. • legal and evidential burden of proving breach of contract on P;
• legal and evidential burden of proving defence of frustration on D; and • legal and evidential burden of proving negligence which obviated the frustration on P.
Revision tip Revision tip
Identify the facts in issue in a problem scenario. This may include all the elements of the offence and also any statutory or common law defences. Note that statute may expressly place an evidential burden on the defence -see s54 (5) required proof that the loss was caused by perils at sea. The plaintiff ship owners claimed the cause was a collision with an unidentifi ed submarine. The defendant insurers argued the cause was wear and tear. The House of Lords held that the ship owners had the task of proving that their explanation was more probable than not rather than more probable than that of the defendant. The court did not have to decide which of the explanations was the least improbable.
Standard of proof
Criminal cases where legal burden is on the prosecution
An incorrect direction may give grounds for appeal. There are a number of cases which
give guidance on the form of words to be used to convey the meaning of beyond reasonable doubt. One example is that of Miller v Minister of Pensions (1947) . This was a civil case but Lord Denning's words (at p372) have been often cited: 'If the evidence against a man is so strong as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence "of course it is possible but not in the least probable", the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt'.
Revision tip
Note the miscarriage of justice case of R v Bentley (2001) on the importance of judicial directions on the burden of proof. In a posthumous appeal the court criticised the trial judge's summing up and, referring also to Bentley's co-defendant, Craig, stated (per Lord Bingham at p326):
By stressing the abundant evidence calling for an answer in support of the prosecution case, and by suggesting that that case had been 'established' and by suggesting that there was a burden on Craig to satisfy the jury that the killing had been accidental (however little, on the facts of the case, the injustice caused to Craig thereby) the jury in our view could well have been left with the impression that the case against the appellant was proved and that they should convict him unless he had satisfi ed them of his innocence.
Criminal cases where legal burden is on the defence
The case law clearly establishes that here the standard is the lower civil one of the balance of probabilities. The evidential burden does not require proof from the defendant, simply adducing suffi cient evidence to convince the judge to allow the matter to be raised at trial, see Jayesena v R (1970) . Lord Devlin (at p624) referred to the need for there to be a reasonable possibility of the existence of the relevant defence.
Civil cases
Here again Lord Denning's dictum , this time on the civil standard in Miller v Minister of Pensions (1947) (at p372) is worth memorising: 'If the evidence is such that the tribunal can
Revision tip Revision tip
Note the miscarriage of justice case of R v Bentley (2001) on the importance of judicial directions y on the burden of proof. In a posthumous appeal the court criticised the trial judge's summing up and, referring also to Bentley's co-defendant, Craig, stated (per Lord Bingham at p326):
By stressing the abundant evidence calling for an answer in support of the prosecution case, and by suggesting that that case had been 'established' and by suggesting that there was a burden on Craig to satisfy the jury that the killing had been accidental (however little, on the facts of the case, the injustice caused to Craig thereby) the jury in our view could well have been left with the impression that the case against the appellant was proved and that they should convict him unless he had satisfi ed them of his innocence. say, "we think it more probable than not", the burden is discharged, but, if the probabilities are equal, it is not.' There has been considerable controversy over whether there are differing standards in civil cases, in particular those where the allegation is a quasi-criminal one, such as fraud or assault on a child. The issue seems to have been conclusively settled by the House of Lords in two cases, namely Re Docherty (2008) and in Re B (Children) (FC) (2008) . It is worth quoting Lord Hoffmann (at para 5) in the latter case in some detail:
Some confusion has however been caused by dicta which suggest that the standard of proof may vary with the gravity of the misconduct alleged or even the seriousness of the consequences for the person concerned. The cases in which such statements have been made fall into three categories.
First, there are cases in which the court has for one purpose classifi ed the proceedings as civil (for example, for the purposes of article 6 of the European Convention) but nevertheless thought that, because of the serious consequences of the proceedings, the criminal standard of proof or something like it should be applied. Secondly, there are cases in which it has been observed that when some event is inherently improbable, strong evidence may be needed to persuade a tribunal that it more probably happened than not. Thirdly, there are cases in which judges are simply confused about whether they are talking about the standard of proof or about the role of inherent probabilities in deciding whether the burden of proving a fact to a given standard has been discharged.
My Lords, I would invite your Lordships fully to approve these observations. I think that the time has come to say, once and for all, that there is only one civil standard of proof and that is proof that the fact in issue more probably occurred than not … I agree … that clarity would be greatly enhanced if the courts said simply that although the proceedings were civil, the nature of the particular issue involved made it appropriate to apply the criminal standard.
In Re Docherty (2008) the House also reaffi rmed that there was one civil standard but applied with some fl exibility according to the seriousness of the allegations, such as sexual abuse. Lord Carswell (at p1509) referred to 'the application of good sense'.
Revision tip
It is possible that you will have an essay question on the debate on the civil standard of proof. You should be aware of examples where although the form of the offence is civil in essence it has a criminal dimension. Thus, in R v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset (2001) Lord Bingham stated (p354) that the proof of conditions for making a sex offender order under s2 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 should be to 'a civil standard of proof which will for all practical circumstances be indistinguishable from the criminal standard'.
Looking for extra marks? Looking for extra marks?
The fi rst class and upper second class student will demonstrate more than an outline knowledge of the key cases. Thus, for example, although it is true to say that the Human Rights Act has had a profound impact on the approach of the English courts to the allocation of the burden of proof, a more scholarly approach would be to show the signifi cance in the judgments of Commonwealth as well as Strasbourg cases. See, for example, the citation of South African cases in Lambert .
Revision tip Revision tip
It is possible that you will have an essay question on the debate on the civil standard of proof. You should be aware of examples where although the form of the offence is civil in essence it has a criminal dimension. Thus, in R v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset (2001) Lord Bingham t stated (p354) that the proof of conditions for making a sex offender order under s2 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 should be to 'a civil standard of proof which will for all practical circumstances be indistinguishable from the criminal standard'. Commenting on the differing approaches to the presumption of innocence he has written (p865) that it 'must be said that the Strasbourg jurisprudence on art 6(2 ) is underdeveloped, not to say fl accid, and it is British judges, taking their cue from Commonwealth constitutional courts, who have sought to give greater sharpness to the right and any exceptions'.
Presumptions
Not all evidence courses include a review of this topic and those that do tend to concentrate on rebuttable presumptions of law. They can take two forms in civil cases, namely persuasive presumptions, which place a legal burden on the party relying on them and evidential presumptions, which place an evidential burden.
Rebuttable presumptions of law
• derive their authority from common law and statute; and
• place on the party relying on the presumption, the burden of presenting the basic facts, which will then be presumed unless the other party presents some countervailing facts. 
Looking for extra marks? Looking for extra marks?
In discussing the nature of the presumption of innocence you need to make the examiner aware that you understand the distinction between the substantive criminal law and the adjectival law of evidence. In the light of the reticence of both the Strasbourg and domestic courts to fully address this the law is in a fl uid state. Roberts (2002, p36) 
Figure 2.12 Legal and evidential presumptions
Name of presumption and type
Conditions
Legitimacy: legal Once it is established that the woman was married at the time the child was born or conceived, the child is presumed to be fathered by the husband. The party challenging the presumption will have to convince the court to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt. i) if a marriage has been celebrated there is a presumption that legal formalities have been followed. Applies to foreign as well as UK marriages; ii) the marriage is presumed to have essential validity in that the parties have the capacity to marry and their consent is genuine; and iii) if a couple have cohabited they did so as man and wife.
The party challenging the presumption has the burden of proof to the high standard of beyond reasonable doubt in i) but to the lower standard of the balance of probabilities in ii) and iii).
Cases: Mahadervan v Mahadervan (1964)
Regularity: evidential
There are two aspects to the concept of 'regularity':
1. public acts have been properly performed and public officials have been properly appointed; and 2. mechanical devices are working properly.
Cases: (1978) . This concerned the actions of a health and safety inspector.
Campbell v Wallsend Slipway and Engineering
(NB in a criminal case the prosecution may not be able to rely on the presumption to establish facts in issue, eg that escaped prisoners had been lawfully in a police officer's custody: see Dillon v R (1982)). (1950) . This involved the operation of a police speedometer.
Nicholas v Penny
Death: evidential
If someone is not heard of for seven years, by people who might be expected to have heard from him during that period, he will be presumed to have died. NB there is no presumption about the date of death.
Cases: Bullock v Bullock (1960)
Res ipsa loquitur: evidential
Applies in a civil case where a state of affairs is under the control of the defendant and an accident occurred which would not normally happen in the absence of negligence on the part of the defendant. There is a presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if there is no other plausible explanation.
Current approach is that it is an evidential presumption, see Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat (1988) The prosecution had to prove that C had not ensured the employee's health and safety or prevented exposure to risk. This established breach, unless the defendant could establish that it had not been reasonably practicable to do so. The prosecution did not have to identify and prove specifi c breaches of duty; the overriding test was whether or not defendants had been given fair notice of the claim against them. [1975] QB 27 E was convicted of selling alcohol without a licence. He appealed on the grounds that the prosecution had not produced evidence that he had not been granted a licence. His appeal was dismissed.
R v Edwards
Under the common law where a statute prohibited an act, save in specifi ed circumstances, the court could construe the statute such that the burden of proving the existence of the circumstances, including the granting of a licence, could lie on the defendant. In order to comply with s3(1) HRA it may be necessary to read down a statutory provision which imposes a legal burden of proof on the defendant. Given the seriousness of the offence, if the HRA had been in force, the court should have imposed only a evidential burden on the accused in relation to s28(3)(b)(i) . [1957] 1 QB 547
R v Lobell
On a charge of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, the accused argued that he was acting in self-defence. The trial judge held that the burden of proving this lay on him. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.
The prosecution had the legal burden of disproving self-defence. The issue should only be put to the jury if the accused produced suffi cient evidence to make it possible for a reasonable jury to acquit. This is an instance of what are known as common law defences where the accused has the task of producing suffi cient evidence to make the issue a live one before the jury but the legal burden remains on the accused. At common law in criminal proceedings the burden of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, the actus reus and the mens rea is on the prosecution. The two exceptions to this rule were the defence of insanity and statutory provisions.
Sheldrake v DPP; A-G's Ref
Topic
Is it a satisfactory response to the placing of a reverse burden in regulatory offences to decriminalise such activity?
Author
N Padfi eld
Viewpoint
Argues for a category of administrative regulations which would carry little stigma and for which strict liability or reversing the burden of proof would be acceptable. (1996) and argues (at p499) that rejection of a third standard 'was perhaps over-hasty'. 
Source
